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Hobbes’s science of politics rests on a dual analysis of human beings: 
humans as complex material bodies in a network of mechanical forces, prone 
to passions and irrationality; and humans as subjects of right and obligation, 
morally exhortable by appeal to the standards of reason. The science of 
politics proposes an absolutist model of politics. If this proposal is not to 
be idle utopianism, the enduring functioning of the model needs to be 
compatible with the materialist analysis of human behaviour. In this paper, 
I argue that Hobbes's attempts to render his science of politics compatible 
with his materialism are only partly successful; a fuller compatibility is 
achieved in the political writings of Spinoza. 
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Hobbes’s science of politics rests on a dual analysis of human beings: humans as 
complex material bodies in a network of mechanical forces, prone to passions and 
irrationality; and humans as subjects of right and obligation, morally exhortable by 
appeal to the standards of reason. Traditionally the secondary literature has displayed 
a greater interest in the latter analysis (Warrender 1957; Nagel 1959; Kavka 1986). 
However, this paper finds the former is equally worthy of attention. Specifically, I 
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claim that for Hobbes’s science of politics to succeed, it must be compatible with the 
analysis of human beings as potentially irrational material bodies. This compatibility 
cannot be taken for granted: I argue that although Hobbes does attempt to constrain 
his science of politics by the results of his material analysis of human beings, he is 
only partly successful. I argue that critically examining the determination of political 
actors’ behaviour in a web of causal relations should lead to a serious reconsideration 
of the conclusions of Hobbes’s science of politics; a reconsideration carried out not 
by Hobbes within his own oeuvre, but rather in the work of Benedict de Spinoza. 
 
§1 
In this first section, I seek to establish a Hobbesian criterion for a successful science 
of politics.1 This criterion will involve some reference to Hobbes’s science of human 
beings, but determining this relation precisely is complicated by the fact, as I 
foreshadowed in my introductory remarks, that there are two different parallel 
analyses within the science of human beings.2 
                                                
1 For Hobbes, the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘science’ are interchangeable (L ix.1 and table). 
Hence, his science of politics is equivalent to his civil philosophy. 
I have used the following abbreviations for Hobbes’s texts, derived from the texts’ original 
titles, and I list them in an order corresponding to their original composition: 
EL = The Elements of Law (Hobbes 1969) 
DC = De Cive (Hobbes 2006) 
L = Leviathan (Hobbes 1994) 
DCo = De Corpore (Hobbes 1656) 
DH = De Homine (Hobbes 1972) 
I have avoided using the Molesworth edition of Hobbes’s writings, given the inadequacies of 
those texts. See the discussions in Tuck (2006, xlviii) and Curley (1994, lxxi). 
2 Although Hobbes’s language is gendered, his conceptual analysis is to a remarkable degree 
ungendered, particularly by comparison with other canonical figures from the history of 
political thought – for instance, consider Hobbes’s refusal to naturalize the authority of men 
over women (L xx.4–5). Correspondingly, I have sought to reformulate Hobbes’s arguments 
in gender neutral terms. This results in the infelicity of replacing Hobbes’s ‘science of man’ 
with the less elegant ‘science of human beings’ or ‘science of the human body’. 
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I start by laying out three characteristics of Hobbesian science in general: its 
materialism, its speculative character, and its practical orientation. Hobbes’s science 
is materialist: he claims that there is in the universe nothing but body and its accidents, 
and the motion of bodies (DCo i.8, vi.5–6). Furthermore, there can be no cause of 
motion in a body except another ‘Body Contiguous, and Moved’ (DCo ix.7). As a 
corollary, human beings lack free will. This is because the mental processes of 
reflection and decision which lead to human actions are consequences of mechanical 
causes; they are ‘motions of the mind’ (DCo vi.6) following the interaction between 
the organs of sense and imagination and the material impetus they encounter. If 
materials forces are sufficient to generate a certain mental state which results in a 
bodily action, then the person does not have some immaterial power to resist this 
determination (L vi.1, xxi.4). For all motions that occur are determined to occur by 
prior motions; all events are linked to prior events by chains of mechanical causation. 
This means that propositions concerning future events are either necessarily true or 
false; if we tend to speak of future events as contingent, this is merely a reflection of 
our ignorance regarding the causes already in train (DCo ix.6, x.4–5). 
Hobbes’s science is speculative. For him, the knowledge derived from sense 
and from experience, and even from experimentation, fails to count as science; that 
knowledge merely reports the fact of what has occurred, and the prudence that builds 
on it only fallibly projects the tendencies of the past into the future. Such knowledge 
is useful and necessary to science, but nonetheless distinguishable from it. Science, by 
contrast, establishes definitions that grasp the generation (causes) and effects 
(consequences) of bodies according to their nature. With these definitions in hand, the 
truths of science are deductive, taking the conditional form, ‘if this be x, then y 
follows’ (EL I.iv.11, I.vi.4; L iii.7, v.1-2, v.17, ix.1; DCo i.2, vi.1, vi.13; Anstey 2005, 
215; Johnston 1986, 51–52; Shapin, Schaffer, and Hobbes 1985, 7). Because of his 
speculative conception of science, there is an important methodological difference 
between Hobbes’s sciences of two kinds of bodies: 
 
For two chief kinds of Bodies, and very different from one another, offer 
themselves to those who search after their Generation & Properties; One 
whereof being the work of Nature, is called a Naturall Body; the other is 
called a Commonwealth, and is made by the wills and agreements of men. 
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And from these spring the two parts of Philosophy called Naturall and Civill. 
(DCo i.9) 
 
For natural bodies, science cannot simply stipulate its own definitions, but 
rather it needs to grasp principles ‘placed in the things themselves by the Authour of 
nature’ (DCo xxv.1), and via grasp of these principles it needs to reconstruct the 
bodies’ causes and investigate their effects. By contrast, with artificial bodies, the 
principle of the body lies in the intention or definition in accord with which humans 
attempt to produce it (DH x.4–5). The core definition of the artificial body of the 
commonwealth is an association for peaceful coexistence; an association for getting 
‘out of that miserable condition of war’ (L xvii.1). Thus the science of politics needs 
first of all to seek the canonical causes of such a body. Frequently the actual 
commonwealth will not properly live up to this definition, and the intentions of its 
actual makers may even diverge from the canonical definition (for instance, they may 
be driven by glory rather than peace); but only secondarily does the science attempt to 
say what constitutes the actual inadequate and often war-torn commonwealths before 
us (L xxx.5). The logic of this science of artificial bodies might be clarified by 
comparison with geometry (DH x.5). To understand a circle, we need to understand it 
as a figure whose circumference is traceable by points equidistant from a central 
point; the science of circles is not first of all the science of actual imperfect circles in 
their imperfection. 
Finally, Hobbes has a practical conception of science. 
 
The End or Scope of Philosophy, is, that we may make use to our benefit of 
effects formerly seen, or that by application of Bodies to one another, we 
may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our minde, as far forth 
as matter, strength & industry will permit, for the commodity of human 
life. ... the scope of all speculation is the performing of some action, or some 
thing to be done. (DCo i.6; see also L xlvi.1) 
 
Thus, even though a science may be trivially true when it states consequences of a 
definition, the science is not substantially successful if there is no way of relating it to 
the practical world of bodies within which humans live. Specifically, Hobbes claims 
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that a proper science of politics will explain the causes of war in such a way that 
human industry can in the future prevent war (DCo i.7; Johnston 1986, 53). 
I now turn to consider the science of human beings in detail. I claim that 
Hobbes offers two complementary scientific analyses of human beings: the first 
corresponds to the mechanistic causes and consequences of human beings as natural 
bodies, whereas the second treats the rational or moral consequences of those natural 
bodies (Johnston 1986, 45–46; Matheron 1986, 77–78). Hobbes cites Harvey’s 
discovery of the science of the circulation of the blood as the start of the science of 
the human body (DCo Epis.13). He begins his own 'science of man' by analysing the 
human body’s causes and effects in a network of material forces. He builds a 
systematic mechanistic account of the body’s function and effects, starting with optics 
and perception; then imagination and mental functioning; finally treating the genesis 
of passions, dispositions, and judgement (EL I.ii-iv, vii-x; DC i.1–6; L i-iii, viii, x–
xiii; DH xi–xiii). It is a science of how human bodies for the most part behave; he 
characterises it as a study of ‘man as matter’ (L Intro.2–4). The substantive result of 
this science is the identification of some generally shared features of our material 
constitution, which he calls human nature. He claims that ‘of the voluntary acts of 
every man the object is some good to himself’. (L xiv.8) This is not yet a substantial 
uniformity, because ‘good’ means simply whatever a given person desires, and 
human desires vary widely, according to their constitution and experience (L vi.7). 
Nonetheless Hobbes claims there is one desire that human beings do share, one 
baseline preference ordering: a preference in favour of self-preservation (L xv.17), 
and specifically, avoidance of violent death. It is an ‘absolutely certain postulat[e] of 
human nature’ that ‘each man strives to avoid violent death as the supreme evil in 
nature’. (DC Epis.10; see also L xiv.29) 
It is important to see that Hobbes makes no general attribution of rationality to 
human nature, not even of a self-interested economic variety. The human nature he 
identifies is merely a basic proto-rational passion, and the ‘natural reason’ belonging 
to human nature (DC Epis.10) is simply an immediate aversion, with a minimal 
associated elementary causal reasoning about how to satisfy it. No capacity is 
postulated to see or act on one’s own long-term interest, nor is there any claim that 
humans by nature pursue self-preservation according to means that will be effective. 
To the contrary, that pursuit tends to be limited by inadequate knowledge and 
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judgement, and derailed by pressing passions (DC iii.26; L viii, xvii.2). This is not to 
deny that humans sometimes do display reason. In the absence of free will, the 
passions opposing reason cannot simply be wished away, but sometimes they are 
materially overcome. Sometimes there is an unusual convergence of causes that gives 
rise to an exceptional individual who is durably rational, or to a moment of clarity in 
someone not otherwise durably rational. And sometimes structural factors can 
conduce to a greater degree of rationality in a population, for instance being in a 
stable commonwealth where social circumstances do not inflame the passions, and 
where careful education cultivates clear and correct thinking. 
At a certain point in Hobbes’s science of human beings, he shifts to consider 
the consequences of the human body in terms of reason rather than mechanics (DC 
i.7; L xiv). These two analyses are distinguished, although Hobbes does not mark the 
distinction as being particularly significant. Rather than showing how humans in fact 
tend to behave, Hobbes now outlines how reason dictates that humans ought to 
behave. This second science of the human body generates natural rights, and the 
duties of the laws of nature (EL xv.1; DC ii.1, iii.33; L xiv.3, xv.41). Hobbes starts 
from the premise that humans by their nature are motivated to work for their self-
preservation and to avoid violent death. He stipulates that humans are not only 
entitled to pursue those motivations, but also that they ought to pursue them in 
accordance with correct reasoning. Hobbes argues that the first dictate of reason is to 
seek peace. He then builds up increasingly detailed and specific requirements on 
conduct, especially regarding covenants and agreements (EL xiv.14, xv-xvii; DC i.15, 
ii-iii; L xiv.4–33, xv). 
This second science of human beings is prescriptive, not explanatory. To be 
sure, Hobbes is not totally pessimistic regarding the possibility of a population 
abiding by the laws of nature. Although reason tout court may be very rare to obtain 
(L v.17), reason enough to grasp the law of nature is more widely accessible, if 
preached and taught appropriately (DC iii.26; L xxx.6). Yet achieving and putting 
into play this rational acceptance of the law of nature is still not straightforward. 
When people attempt to determine the requirements of the law of nature, they often 
get it wrong (DC ii.1); for instance, think of Hobbes’s infamous fool who believes it 
is acceptable to break promises whenever it suits her (L xv.4). And even if the 
understanding of the law of nature were correct, the problem of motivation would 
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remain. Hobbes insists that the laws of nature are contrary to humans’ natural 
passions and are not generally followed simply for their own sakes (DC iii.27; L 
xiv.31, xvii.2). Even though the second science of human beings speaks in detail 
about rational conduct, that conduct is not readily or automatically obtained. 
The science of politics is created both by and out of humans, and consequently 
needs to be built upon the science of human bodies (DC Pref.9; L Intro.2; DCo i.9). I 
take no position on the question of whether Hobbes’s science of natural bodies entails 
his science of politics. (On that topic, see Watkins [1989].) Instead, I simply attempt 
to make precise how that former science might constrain the latter. I rule out two 
extreme possibilities in order to establish more clearly the account that I favour. A 
first attempt to specify the relation might claim that the science of politics is simply 
an extension of the first science of human beings: just as that science considers 
human matter in terms of the mechanical causes of its actual existence, including its 
imperfect rationality, so too a science of politics needs to consider the commonwealth 
as the entity it actually is, in all its malfunctions. But this proposal must be rejected, 
because it fails to appreciate the distinction between sciences of natural and of 
artificial bodies. As outlined earlier, the science of the artificial body of the 
commonwealth must first of all be a science of the ideal body which achieves the goal 
of peace, not of the imperfect body that we see before us. Indeed, Leviathan’s chapter 
on the ‘causes, generation, and definition’ of the commonwealth starts by articulating 
‘[t]he final cause, end, or design for which the commonwealth is established, namely 
peace’ (L xvii.1; see also DC Pref.14–15). 
A second and opposite attempt to specify the relation between the science of 
politics and the science of human beings might claim that the science of politics is 
simply an extension of the science of human beings as rational actors. For if we are 
considering an ideal commonwealth that is stably peaceful, why not also consider 
ideal causes – that is, rational human beings? Indeed, Hobbes sometimes characterises 
the science of politics simply as a science of rights and duties, and of the rule of just 
and unjust (DC Pref.1; L ix table; DCo i.7, i.9). But I claim that whilst the science of 
politics may include this, it needs also to include a model of politics that can support 
the outcome of an enduringly peaceful commonwealth, given what we know of actual 
non-ideal human nature. For without such a model, it fails the practicality 
requirement that I outlined earlier: that it provide action guidance to achieve a 
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humanly important purpose. Articulating to everyone their duties does not secure the 
practical purpose of achieving a peaceful commonwealth if we have reason to believe 
that it is implausible that people will live up to these duties. For this reason, the 
science of politics needs to build on the science of human matter (L Intro.2-4); it 
needs to be grounded in ‘the Appetites of Men, and the Passions of their Minds’ (DCo 
iv.7); it cannot simply rely on words and promises (L xlvi.35–36). Specifically, a 
model of politics which for its functioning relies heavily on a population of humans 
who are already rational would fail the test of practicality, because the science of 
human beings as material bodies tells us that it only even starts to be plausible that a 
population should be rational after a political order has been put in place to moderate 
the passions. 
Between these two mistaken extremes, the required constraint that the 
sciences of humans beings place on the science of politics emerges, and I will 
articulate it via three characteristics. First, the science of politics is not simply the 
science of the body of the commonwealth as it materially exists. Rather, it is first and 
foremost a science of an intended goal: a stably peaceful society. Part of its task is to 
put forward a model of such a society. Second, the science of human beings as moral 
subjects of rational duty serves as a limiting criterion for that model: the constraint on 
subjects proposed in the model of politics should be rationally justifiable, such that 
rational subjects ought to acquiesce to it. Third, the science of human beings as 
material bodies also serves as a limiting criterion for that model: the model of politics 
must be such that it can plausibly peacefully endure, when populated not by perfect 
moral actors but by ordinary material humans. All these three characteristics are 
important, but for the purposes of this paper, I now focus only on the final one: 
whether the proposed model will materially and plausibly succeed in securing an 
enduringly peaceful commonwealth.  
 
§2 
Hobbes’s science of politics makes efforts to comply with this material criterion. In 
this section I distinguish two aspects of that compliance: the compliance of the 
modelling of subject behaviour, and the compliance of the modelling of sovereign 
behaviour. I argue that Hobbes is successful in respect of subjects but unsuccessful in 
respect of sovereigns. I will focus my discussion on the case of a sovereign who is a 
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monarch rather than an aristocratic or democratic assembly, both for simplicity’s sake, 
but also because it is the canonical case in which Hobbes’s science should work most 
straightforwardly. 
The goal of Hobbes’s science of politics is a peaceful political order (DC i.1; 
L xvii.1). An interrogation of Hobbes’s political theory from the point of view of 
right or rationality might find it adequate simply to consider the convenantal moment 
of the establishment of the commonwealth. Hobbes offers two alternative canonical 
causal geneses: sovereignty by institution and sovereignty by acquisition. Subjects’ 
fear of each other establishes a sovereign by institution: subjects mutually agree to 
defer to a single ruler, not because that ruler is antecendently frightening to them, but 
because they hope that the ruler will prevent them from harming one another. 
Subjects’ fear of a powerful conqueror establishes a sovereign by acquisition: subjects 
each defer to a conqueror out of direct fear of harm at the conqueror’s hands. 
Regardless of which genesis is followed, a covenant is argued to establish absolute 
right for the sovereign, and near-absolute concession of right from subjects (DC v.12, 
viii.1; L xvii.15, xviii.1, xx.1–3). This right, once established, remains in force unless 
the sovereign loses its power: for natural law stipulates that valid covenants be kept 
(L xv.1–3). The sovereign has no obligation to do or to avoid any particular conduct, 
although if his or her conduct does lead to a loss of power then loss of right follows 
(L xviii.8, xxix.23). 
However, the focus of my inquiry is not the situation of right, but rather the 
material constitution of the stably peaceful commonwealth; the material requirements 
to obtain obedient behaviour sufficient to secure peace. Again, I start by considering 
the establishment of sovereign power, and it appears that the covenantal moment by 
itself satisfies the material success requirement on the model of the commonwealth. 
By either genesis, the sovereign ‘hath the use of so much power and strength 
conferred on him that by terror thereof he is enabled to conform the wills of them all 
to peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad’ (L xvii.13, emphasis 
added). The initial fact of mass obedience, once obtained even if just for a moment, 
constitutes a power for the sovereign. It gives the sovereign a great number of hands 
to deploy as it pleases. This then also generates ongoing power, because the initial 
compliance provides informants, guards, judges and executioners: in other words, it 
gives the sovereign a great capacity to police and punish disobedience. In the face of 
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this punitive capacity, there is strong pressure for each individual subject to obey. But 
this secondary obedience in turn deepens and reinforces the sovereign’s capacity to 
deploy subjects’ powers for its own purposes. Thus so long as power is established at 
one point in time, it appears the sovereign can behave as it pleases without disrupting 
its effective power (DC v.8; L xvii.13). 
Yet on closer inspection, this mechanism proves to be seriously flawed. 
Hobbes acknowledges that the sovereign needs constant vigilance and needs to 
behave in a very particular way in order to secure peace. ‘Many things are required to 
preserve internal peace, because ... many things conspire to disturb it’. (DC xiii.9) 
This is because even an overwhelming punitive incentive of violent death turns out 
not to be sufficient to secure widespread obedience. There is no challenge to the idea 
that people aim for a good to themselves, yet nonetheless their seditious passions can 
win out when their perceptions of good and bad are distorted. First, people may have 
theological reasons not to consider death as the greatest of evils. People can come to 
believe that eternal torment after death is worse than death itself, and that the point of 
law of nature is not life on earth but life after death (L xv.8). Second, even when 
people still fear violent death above all other things they may subscribe to a flawed 
doctrine of politics or have a flawed perception of politics which prevents them from 
always seeing sufficiently directly the link between obedience to the sovereign and 
avoiding death (EL II.viii.4–10; DC Pref.5–6, xii.1–8; L xviii.20, xxix). These 
distorted beliefs amplify the seditious passions which tend to simmer amongst the 
populace: the combination of the vainglory and ambition of the eminent, and the 
poverty and disaffection of the lowly (EL II.viii.1-3; DC xii.9-12). Discontent is 
dangerous: anyone ‘not contented with their present condition’ may be prone to ‘stir 
up trouble and sedition’ (L xi.4) out of hope to establish a political order in which 
they have a better life (Johnston 1986, 68–69, 93–94, 120–123). 
Indeed, once matters reach this point there is no easy solution: simply 
heightening punitive measures risks provoking the rebellion it aims to quell. Hobbes 
instead recognises that the sovereign’s achieving its ends without incurring the risk of 
rebellion requires a proliferation of carefully calibrated modes of rule, meticulously 
and consistently implemented. The suggestions Hobbes offers fall into four main 
categories. First, teach the correct doctrine of right, at the pulpits and the universities 
(EL II.ix.8; DC xiii.9; L xxx.4–14). Second, intervene in theological debates to re-
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channel fear of the afterlife back into fears of this world (EL II.vi; L xxxviii). In these 
first two suggestions, both the doctrine of duty and theological doctrine are 
considered not merely in their truth but also as material factors in the model of the 
commonwealth: promulgating them is hoped to be effective in shaping conduct in a 
way that supports civil order (DC Pref.20–21). Third, eliminate subjects’ disaffection, 
by being sure always to rule in a scrupulously transparent, fair, measured, and 
equitable manner, by helping those in material want, and by ensuring all public 
officials similarly abide by such high standards of behaviour (EL II.ix.3–6; DC 
xiii.10–11, xiii.17; L xxx.15–18, xxx.20–23). Fourth, deflate the emergence of other 
powers, especially those of subjects who show signs of ambition rather than loyalty 
(EL II.ix.7; DC xiii.12; L xxx.16, xxx.24). In sum, the sovereign must always rule 
according to exacting standards of reason and self-restraint if the political order is to 
stave off war and disorder. (See also Baumgold [1988, 101–109], Frost [2008, 156–
165] and Tarlton [1978, 321–327].) 
To this point, I have considered the problem of bringing subjects to behave in 
the manner required for Hobbes’s model of politics to be plausible. Hobbes’s solution 
relies on prudent rule by the sovereign. I now turn to consider the sovereign’s own 
behaviour from the perspective of the material science of human bodies. In the 
Introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes notoriously compares the creation of the 
commonwealth by human beings to God’s creation of man (L Intro.1–4). The hubris 
of this comparison sits uncomfortably with Hobbes’s admission that human beings 
are not gods, but to the contrary they are always simultaneously matter, parts of 
God’s creation, and weak and irrationality-prone parts at that. What is the relationship 
between the image just sketched of a sovereign who wisely and reliably behaves in 
the way required to sustain the civil order, and the image derived from Hobbes’s 
science of human beings as matter, applicable to the sovereign as to any other human, 
which shows humans to be prone to irrationality and short-sightedness? Indeed, this is 
a topic that has not been broached in the contemporary literature. Even those 
reconstructions of Hobbes’s political theory which are very attentive to material 
considerations with respect to subjects offer no account of how a sovereign might 
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have the wisdom or motivation sufficient to this end (Baumgold 1988, 118–119; Frost 
2008, 156–165; Tarlton 1978, 321–327).3 
Hobbes offers two answers, but I will argue that neither one is satisfactory. 
The first answer from the text is seen in Hobbes’s recommendation that we evaluate 
his science of politics presuming this rational sovereign behaviour, and that we place 
the wicked conduct of the sovereign exterior to the model. Tyrannical rule ‘is in fact 
in every kind of commonwealth a great disadvantage where it occurs (it is the 
occurrence that is the disadvantage, not the possibility that it may occur), but the fault 
is the Ruler’s, not the Régime’s’ (DC x.17; see also DC vii.4). Tyrannical rule is not 
the fault of the model of politics, but of those ‘who misuse their authority for their 
own greed when they are appointed to such a position of power’ (DC vi.17). Hobbes 
does not elaborate why the bad conduct of the sovereign is irrelevant to the evaluation 
of his model of politics, but I reconstruct the logic by an appeal to the character of the 
science of politics as a science of artificial bodies. Recall that such a science identifies 
the principles governing the body under consideration not by appeal to its existence as 
a natural object, but by appeal to the artificer’s intention. But surely this means that 
the artificer is placed external to the body being made. If we understand the science of 
politics as addressed to the sovereign as artificer – and indeed, the text seems to 
operate with presumption that the sovereign, ‘he that is to govern a whole nation’ (L 
Intro.4), is the artificer4 – then the statement of the sovereign’s actions is not a 
statement of how the sovereign is likely to behave. Rather, it is a statement of advice 
to the sovereign as an artificer who stands prior to and apart from the body being 
artificed. In other words, Hobbes’s science of politics, as it applies to the sovereign’s 
conduct, is akin to the older genre of ‘mirror for princes’: it is not nor should it be 
                                                
3 It is true that the Hobbesian sovereign is obliged to God to rule prudently (see L xxx.1). But 
this does not address my worry regarding material causality.  Sovereigns may well have such 
an obligation to God, but the question is whether they will have the wisdom or motivation to 
fulfil this obligation. 
4 Matheron (1986, 77–78) also argues from a Spinozist perspective that having human beings 
modelled simultaneously as matter and artificer is a problem for Hobbes’s system, but he 
reads the problematic duality as applying at the level of political subjects. To the contrary, I 
have claimed that the problem at the subject level is resolvable; rather, the intractable 
difficulty arises when the dual modelling is applied to the sovereign. 
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judged as a material science of the sovereign’s behaviour. To the contrary, the science 
of politics should be understood as a doctrine of rationality, obligation, or duty of the 
sovereign, given his or her commitment to artificing the kind of body that is the 
commonwealth. The merit of a political model should be judged as it would be if the 
rulers were prudent and good; the possible wickedness of a ruler in no way impugns 
the model because the ruler ought not have behaved in that way, and in a certain sense 
is not part of the model. 
I argue, however, that this first answer alone is entirely inadequate. The 
sovereign is not an external artificer who acts at a point in time, separable from the 
artificed body, like a transcendent God who creates the world in the course of a week. 
Rather, as I have demonstrated, sovereignty is an ongoing active role within the 
model without which the model doesn’t function. It is this temporal extension which 
makes it necessary to consider the sovereign as an element within the model of 
politics, subject to the material plausibility requirement. To put this another way, 
suppose the doctrine of the sovereign’s rational duty could not be complemented and 
undergirded by a material account of how the conduct required of the sovereign might 
plausibly be achieved. This amounts to supposing that it is predictable that a part of 
Hobbes’s scientific model will not be able to do what is required for the model to 
function. In this case, the political model would fail Hobbes’s practicality requirement. 
This brings me to Hobbes's second answer. Although Hobbes’s texts do not 
give nearly as much attention to the determinate causes of behaviour of rulers as they 
do to subjects, and even though his absolutism does not place any specifically crafted 
external constraint on the sovereign (as it did on subjects) to bring its behaviour in 
line with what the model requires, nonetheless Hobbes does make some effort to 
demonstrate the compatibility of the pattern of conduct he is requiring from the 
sovereign with an understanding of the sovereign itself as just another weakness-
prone human body. Hobbes himself implicitly recognises the need to account for the 
plausibility of the modelled sovereign behaviour: he analyses the ‘aptitude’ of the 
various forms of sovereignty (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) ‘to produce the 
peace and security of the people’ (L xix.4). He proposes that the rationality that is 
presumed will intrinsically be produced because of the political structure. This sketch 
of sovereign motivation is provided in two parts; however, the first part fails and the 
second part is weak. 
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The first part of the sketch of sovereign motivation consists in the frequently 
made claim that the sovereign will rule wisely because of the coincidence of interests 
and power between the sovereign and the subjects. The ‘strength and glory’ of the 
sovereign consists in the ‘vigour’ of its subjects (L xviii.20). Consequently, 
sovereigns will not rule tyrannically because they harm themselves by doing so, and 
even risk bringing about their own downfall. Will the sovereign kill its subjects to 
seize their wealth? Will the sovereign rob and kill some subjects in order to curry 
favour with others? Hobbes denies that the sovereign is likely to desire to do these 
things: ‘there is no reason why he would want to spoil his citizens, since that is not to 
his advantage’. (DC vi.13; see also EL II.v.1; DC xiii.2; L xviii.20, xxx.21) 
Commentators such as Pettit (2008, 128–129) often accept these claims at face value.5 
Unfortunately, taken by itself this sketch fails. Ruling well may indeed aid the 
sovereign in avoiding the downfall of the regime in the long term; but the crucial 
question will be whether it is plausible that this fact will provide sufficient motivation 
to govern the sovereign’s conduct: whether the risk of downfall constitutes a 
sufficiently strong motive to outweigh the other and more immediate determinants of 
the sovereign’s action (passions and incentives). The prima facie reason to doubt its 
sufficiency is the highly exacting standards of rationality and restraint that the model 
of politics demands of the sovereign, as I laid out earlier. Indeed, in other contexts 
Hobbes is acutely aware of a slippage between true interest and actual motivation. 
‘Men cannot divest themselves of the irrational desire to reject future goods for the 
sake of present goods (which inevitably entail unexpected evils)’. (DC iii.32; see also 
L xviii.20) I have shown that in the case of political subjects, subjects’ rationality is 
not relied upon for the sustainability of the model. The reason for this was that the 
material science of human beings shows that exhortation to behave rationally, without 
strong institutional, material, and punitive support, is insufficient for vast majority of 
humans. A similar principle must apply to the sovereign. 
The second part of Hobbes’s sketch of sovereign motivation is more 
promising. He proposes that certain aspects of the sovereign’s social position generate 
immediate pressures that will reliably produce the requisite rational behaviour, even 
                                                
5 This easy acceptance is especially curious against the backdrop of Pettit's other writings 
(Pettit 1999), which insist on the need to keep rulers in check, precisely because their 
interests diverge from those of the people. I thank Geneviève Rousselière for this point. 
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without presupposing some strong intrinsic rationality. Hobbes observes that 
sovereigns are not only sovereigns, but also private individuals. 
 
[W]hosoever beareth the person of the people, or is one of that assembly that 
bears it, beareth also his own natural person. And though he be careful in his 
politic person to procure the common interest, yet he is more (or no less) 
careful to procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and friends, 
and for the most part if the public interest chance to cross the private, he 
prefers the private; for the passions of men are commonly more potent than 
their reason. (L xix.4) 
 
The private passions are more immediate than the public, presumably because they tie 
in with the immediate affective pressures of bodily enjoyment and face-to-face social 
interactions. Nonetheless, Hobbes claims that in fact these align with public duty, and 
there are no systematic incentives for ruling badly. He considers the monarch’s desire 
for personal glory and his or her proclivity to favour friends and family. Both are 
fairly immediate and pressing passions; and Hobbes claims that the first aligns with 
the common good, and the second is unlikely to cause harm. The monarch finds 
personal glory in the wealth of his or her nation: and he or she only has a finite circle 
of friends on which to bestow gifts, so there will be a limit to how much wealth will 
be diverted from the public good (EL II.v.5–7; DC vi.13, x.6–7, x.18; L xix.4–9). 
Hobbes’s speculative claims regarding how a sovereign is likely to behave are 
not entirely unconvincing. But once we weight them against alternative speculative 
scenarios, they are shown to be implausible. I will now consider briefly two sources 
from the history of political thought that provide alternative accounts of the pressures 
on the absolute sovereign. First, in Machiavelli’s analysis, the structure of immediate 
incentives in absolutist political orders is not argued to be conducive to peace; it is 
neutral. But this leaves wide open the path of imprudent and destabilising rule by an 
incautious sovereign. Machiavelli concedes that perhaps there are some people of 
proven, strikingly just dispositions who might exercise restraint in their role as 
absolute sovereign. However, he observes that in absolute monarchy, rule tends to 
become hereditary, and as soon as it does so, the privileged and pampered upbringing 
of the younger generation in their personal affairs leads to sumptuous and lascivious 
rule, with new monarchs spending money to satisfy their own luxurious tastes as well 
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as showering it on their friends and family. Unlike Hobbes, Machiavelli refuses to 
downplay the political seriousness of diverting public wealth to private purposes. It is 
not simply a question of the volume of resources transferred but also a question of the 
political effects if people view the transfer as unfair. Luxury and favouritism provoke 
hatred from the populace and hostility from upstanding citizens. Such degenerate 
rulers become fearful, and in order to suppress the risk of an uprising of the 
upstanding citizens and the people, they rule tyrannically. This generates longer-term 
instability and weakness, because it increases the hatred of the populace even as it 
temporarily prevents that hatred being expressed; yet rulers act this way for the sake 
of short term maintenance of their preferred way of life (Machiavelli 1996, I.2.3). 
Where Machiavelli views the structure of incentives on sovereigns to be 
neutral, in Spinoza’s view it is frankly perverse. It is not merely that there are 
problematic passions which are not suppressed by the absolutist structure, but worse, 
the absolutist model of politics predictably and positively produces pressure on the 
monarchical sovereign to rule badly. The tasks of ruling are too great for an 
individual to bear alone; consequently an absolute monarchy will always actually 
have a covert power structure of advisors and confidants. The absolute monarch 
always lives in fear of usurpation by one of these advisors, and in fear of the public 
shifting its allegiance. To stave off elite usurpation and to disempower any popular 
uprising, the absolute monarch rules corruptly and tyrannically, oppressing the weak 
and appeasing the strong. To stave off being deposed by their own progeny, monarchs 
deliberately raise them to be politically inept. However, just as in the Machiavellian 
scenario, this envisaged conduct cuts against the sovereign’s self-preservation in the 
longer term. Those who are appeased recognise the fragility of their privilege at the 
hands of an unconstrained monarch, and remain ready at any moment to usurp him or 
her; those who are oppressed do not develop deep commitment to or love for the 
monarch, so they will shift their allegiance the moment it becomes strategic to do so 
(Spinoza 2000, 5.7, 6.5–6.7, 7.1, 7.14).  
In conclusion, even if Hobbes’s doctrine of the sovereign’s right is granted, 
the material plausibility of his model of politics fails to withstand the Machiavellian 
and Spinozist critiques. Rulers find themselves under pressure to garner short-term 
political support by buying off potential usurpers and repressing the populace. Such a 
logic steers rulers away from rational rule. Hobbes may achieve a plausible 
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mechanical model of the behaviour of political subjects, but the model fails the 
plausibility test with respect to the conduct of the sovereign. 
 
§3 
In this final section, I imagine and address an objection to my argument, and I 
demonstrate how the Spinozist model of politics provides an alternative to the 
Hobbesian absolutist model which avoids the problems that I have raised with the 
latter, and at the same time should satisfy my imagined objector. 
My argument to this point has taken a strong view of what is required for an 
adequate science of politics. I have demanded that the behaviour of each element in 
the model of politics, including the sovereign, should be consistent with the 
predictions of the materialist science of human beings. But I can imagine someone 
objecting that the demand I have levelled at the science of politics is incoherent. A 
science which seeks to meet the Hobbesian practicality requirement needs some space 
for action that is different from what people are just plausibly likely to do. Insofar as 
the science of politics seeks not merely pure understanding but also to make a 
practical difference, it must be possible for someone to change existing reality in 
accord with its recommendations – and this means someone who acts differently from 
how people usually act. My demand for a strict compatibility with the materialist 
account of usual sovereign behaviour would result in a political model that is a mere 
description or analysis of the status quo rather than anything which might serve and 
advance human purposes. We can have any hope at all for practical political change 
because human beings are potentially amenable to reason regarding their interests, 
and occasionally, unexpectedly far-sighted rational behaviour will occur despite 
contrary incentives. And so, with respect to the artificer or actor of a political order, it 
is necessary to relax the materialism requirement. 
I now identify a kernel of truth in this imagined objection, but I show that the 
appropriate response does not lie in Hobbes’s absolutism. I start by clarifying my 
agreement with three of the imagined objection’s premises. First, I grant that there 
needs to be some space in a practically-oriented science of politics to call for 
behaviour or intervention which is active and would not simply otherwise occur. 
Second, I grant that people on occasion can have moments of clear-sightedness which 
allow them to act rationally in the Hobbesian sense (acting in view of long-term self-
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interest), and I even grant that a few individuals may consistently have this capacity. 
And third, I grant that the actions of such individuals can have lasting positive 
political ramifications. The point which separates my view from the view of my 
imagined objector is the problem of reliably maintaining and expressing that 
rationality. Recalling Machiavelli’s and Spinoza’s analysis from the previous section, 
the difficulty with absolutism was not simply that it required the rationality of the 
sovereign, but that it relied on that rationality being sustained over time, without or 
contrary to institutional pressures. It was the ongoing imbrication of the sovereign’s 
action in the everyday functioning of the political order that forced us to consider the 
sovereign as an integral part of the materiality of the political model and not rely on a 
materially unsupported rationality in her or his conduct. 
If this analysis is correct, the appropriate response to my imagined objector 
becomes clear. The sovereign should be treated as part of the model, due to its 
ongoing role in its functioning. By contrast, the artificer of the political order should 
not be a role occupied by the sovereign; but rather it should be a catalytic role 
external to the model of politics which puts it into play in the first place. My imagined 
objector can then be satisfied that the science of politics features an agent of change, 
without the model being implausible in its ongoing material functioning. I’ll first lay 
out the alternative Spinozist model of politics which features the sovereign as an 
integral part; then I’ll address the question of agency. 
Despite adhering closely to a Hobbesian model of political right (Spinoza 
2000 3.2–3.3, 4.1–4.2), Spinoza diverges from Hobbes in his material analysis and 
institutional proposals. He sees it as essential that the ongoing function of the model 
of politics should not rest on any individual’s rationality and self-control, and 
observes explicitly that this applies also to the sovereign ruler.  
 
Now if human nature were so constituted that men desired most of all what 
was most to their advantage, no special skill would be needed to secure 
harmony and trust. But since, admittedly, human nature is far otherwise 
constituted, the state must necessarily be so established that all men, both 
rulers and ruled, whether they will or no, will do what is in the interests of 
their common welfare; that is, either voluntarily or constrained by necessity, 
they will all live as reason prescribes. (Spinoza 2000, 6.3; emphasis added) 
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Instead, the sovereign is thought of as human matter, internal to the political system. 
Spinoza refuses to leave political decision to the institutionally unconstrained 
judgement of the sovereign. 
 
So if the safety of a state is dependent on some man’s good faith, and its 
affairs cannot be properly administered unless those responsible for them are 
willing to act in good faith, that state will lack all stability. If it is to endure, 
its government must be so organised that its ministers cannot be induced to 
betray their trust or to act basely, whether they are guided by reason or by 
passion. (Spinoza 2000, 1.6) 
 
He provides detailed recommendations for the case of monarchical sovereign rule, 
organised around the principle that a ruler’s transient personal passions and desires 
need to be constrained by stabilising institutions. The monarch should have a 
governing council constituted representatively from the population, and all 
governmental decisions and functions should be performed by way of the council 
(Spinoza 2000, 6.15–6.25). Even though technically the sovereign’s will is the source 
of laws, this should not be interpreted in such a way as to give any authority to the 
monarch’s whims and passions: ‘For the fundamental laws of the state should be 
regarded as the king’s eternal decrees, so that his ministers are entirely obedient in 
refusing to execute his orders if he commands something that is opposed to the state’. 
(Spinoza 2000, 7.1) 
Spinoza claims that the strength of a political order arises not from the 
sovereign’s moral qualities but from the fundamental structures of the commonwealth 
which durably constrain it. But to return to the crux of the imagined objection: if we 
do not already possess these structures, who puts them in place? The question is not 
treated directly or at great length by Spinoza, but drawing upon the historical 
examples offered in his and Machiavelli’s writings, we can reconstruct an answer that 
should satisfy my imagined objector. Spinoza discusses the case of the Aragonese 
people. Having cast off the yoke of foreign oppression, they were in a position to 
deliberate explicitly regarding their preferred constitutional structure and they chose 
an elective monarchy subjected to rule of law (Spinoza 2000, 7.30). Machiavelli for 
his part considers examples from the ancient world. Many ancient polities had 
lawgivers: he offers Lycurgus as a laudable example and Solon as a more flawed one 
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(Machiavelli 1996, I.2.5–6). These lawgivers did not rule but rather designed systems 
of laws within which rulers of the polity could govern for the sake of the common 
good. Machiavelli also takes great interest in the case of Rome, in which there was no 
lawgiver but rather a gradual exogenous evolution of social forms that gave rise to a 
division of power between plebs and senate, despite no-one’s having planned that 
outcome (Machiavelli 1996, I.2.7). 
As the example of Rome shows, political agency is not necessary to establish 
a flourishing polity: sometimes chance puts in place good institutions, and the science 
of politics simply identifies and analyses this good functioning retrospectively. 
However, the other examples show that there is a possibility of political agency. To 
draw these examples together into a theory of agency in political change, what is 
required is a political agent willing to serve as lawgiver – or in other words, willing to 
establish a political order to which they will subsequently be subjected – plus a fertile 
political juncture or constitutional moment at which this agent can act. In the 
historical examples given, there is a difference between the lawgiver (be it an 
individual or the wider populace) and the sovereign thereby established. But this strict 
separation is inessential: the crucial element is the kind of constraint which comes to 
bear on the sovereign under the new political order. Lawgivers could subsequently 
become sovereigns, so long as their exceptional moral qualities are only relied upon 
in the initial founding acts; their subsequent ongoing conduct needs to be 
institutionally restrained. As Machiavelli explains, good lawgivers who go on to 
become rulers are careful to make the ‘maintenance’ of the common good rest with 
many, not just in their own hands (Machiavelli 1996, I.9.2). 
In the early modern period, Hobbes was amongst the most strident promoters 
of the idea of understanding human action through a materialistic and deterministic 
lens. Nonetheless, his own science of politics devotes much of its energy to a 
different, more juridical investigation of human behaviour, centred on rationality and 
duty. I have shown that the material view has more profound political ramifications 
than Hobbes realises. Once irrationality is viewed not merely as a moral failing but 
instead as a feature of material bodies that needs to be investigated in its mechanical 
and material causes and effects, the case for a political order that is institutionally 
non-absolute becomes more persuasive. 
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